The “Best and the Brightest” vs. the “Dream Team.”
A comparison of crisis management in the John F. Kennedy and George W. Bush Administrations.
by Mark W. Adams, Attorney, Toledo, Ohio

Kennedy and Cuba

Forty years after JFK assassination it is impossible not to note the similarities in events, yet glaring disparity in style and abilities of George W. Bush and John F. Kennedy. By November of their third year in office both had a chance to mature in their role as Commander-in-Chief. Each President, favorite sons of wealthy and powerful political families, won the Oval Office by the grace of the narrowest margins. More importantly, while surrounding themselves with advisors possessing impeccable credentials, they faced dangerous challenges early in their terms which threatened our very way of life.

Kennedy’s presidency ended abruptly, just prior to the run-up to his reelection campaign. Without inevitable political considerations of office seeking skewing the analysis their effectiveness as leaders (instead of as politicians seeking an-other term) can be fairly scrutinized. In the midst of grave national crises they shared divisive political climates and disagreements between their chief advisors. Their ability to be effective under these circumstances was predicated on their innate intellectual talent, experience and personal management style.

By their third year in office both Kennedy and Bush had each engaged in two military confrontations in the context of a wider international conflict. Kennedy waged the Cold War by ordering the Bay of Pigs invasion and later managing the Cuban Missile Crisis. Bush declared a War on Terrorism after September 11, 2001, then forcibly changed the regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq. Although the enemies both faced differed, the situations were just as grave. We knew that the Soviets might wreck destruction on U.S. cities, Al Queda proved they could.

Kennedy took full responsibility for the failed invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs even though great effort was made to insulate the president from direct involvement. He participated in “weeks and weeks of planning¹ ” in a scheme put into action a year before by his predecessor, Dwight Eisenhower. He learned from this debacle to test his advisors conclusions and indeed the “facts” from which they sprang.

JFK had the luxury of months of planning the Bay of Pigs invasion, yet U.N. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson was not fully informed of the degree of U.S. involvement, embarrassing himself and the administration at the Security Council with an implausible denial. Stevenson, as well a full compliment of State Department experts were fully consulted as active participants in developing a response in the Missile Crisis although the urgency of the situation dictated that a swift response be made.

The military command and CIA (unfortunately more noted for its public disasters than the clandestine successes which seldom see the light of day) presented a completely developed blueprint for the invasion of Cuba shortly after Kennedy’s inauguration. This in no way should imply that JFK was not actively involved in the planning of the Bay of Pigs, indeed he made several tactical modifications to the operation, including the critical decision to scale back the invader’s air cover. The foreign policy team was not so much consulted in the matter but informed, inadequately. In contrast, the Missile Crisis response was developed in consort with State’s experts in Latin America, political affairs, international law and the United Nations, as well as the CIA and Joint Chiefs of Staff. JFK not only made sure he knew as much as he could during the Missile Crisis, he informed and consulted key administrations figures whose counsel he trusted; such as special counsel Theodore Sorensen, Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillon, and his brother, the Attorney General, whose usual role as a domestic law enforcement official did not naturally lend itself to strategic security decisions. Input from the British Prime Minister was also studied and the effects of JFK’s decision on our allies as well as the ramifications of his actions throughout Caribbean and from Dakar to Berlin were explored.

After reconnaissance indicated the existence of nuclear weapons on the island, JFK’s cabinet sharply split over whether to either quarantine Cuba or order an attack to ensure the complete destruction of Cuba’s strategic capabilities.² Kennedy’s careful questioning of his staff began immediately. When shown reconnoissance photographs clearly showing missiles on the ground in Cuba, JFK inquired of the CIA why there was a gap of over two weeks in the sequence of images which was explained as weather and operational concerns. The intelligence services could offer no satisfactory explanation why the Soviet’s medium range bombers were exposed, indeed they were “lined up neatly,” making an easy target. Upon further examination they could not assure the President the exact number of missiles Cuba possessed or if they actually contained nuclear warheads.

Defense Secretary MacNamara and the Diplomatic staff favored the “blockade route.” Kennedy pressed them on the effectiveness of a quarantine: how ships would be stopped, whose ships would be stopped, rules of engagement if a ship resisted, and an estimate of how many more missiles would become operational while the quarantine was set up. Secretary Rusk’s idea was that the blockade would be seen as a strong yet measured response, allowing time for negotiation. Stevenson repeatedly ad-vocated offering to dismantle our missile bases in Turkey and Italy to the Soviets, backed up by the threat of military action in Cuba -- a classic carrot and stick. JFK refused to offer up our NATO bases, at least as part of the initial foray into nego-tiations.

The Joint Chiefs were more in favor of a quick and over-whelming air-strike. General Maxwell Taylor argued for destruction of all bombers on the island as well as the missiles, and even opined that if we resorted to using a nuclear strike to accomplish the mission, we would not be retaliated against in kind. Maxwell’s nuclear option was never acknowledged and Kennedy immediately dismissed the idea of going after the bombers despite Maxwell’s continued arguments to the contrary. Any significant delay, the General suggested, would jeopardize the com-plete elimination of all the nuclear threats on the island.

Kennedy instinctively grasped that the missiles were the real strategic threat and could he live with bombers. Soviet based strategic bombers could refuel in the air and reach the same targets as any based in the Caribbean. He finally got Maxwell to admit air-strikes alone could not guarantee elimination of all the missiles but that an all-out invasion would be necessary to ensure their destruction. Nonetheless the Chairman of the JCS had no faith that a blockade would work. He was committed to the belief that the Cuban missile elimination was nonn-gotiable and that a full military response was an eventuality. A “quarantine” would give the enemy time to camouflage the targets and prepare their air defense, thereby increasing the risk to our forces.

In the end, of course, Kennedy’s final response was a mixture of both camps. He rejected air-strikes, but kept the plan at the ready and ordered the call-up of reserves. He ordered the blockade, but instructed the diplomats to demand the Soviets to remove their intolerable missiles instead of trying to negotiate their withdrawal in exchange for concessions on our part. He made it clear to Khrushchev that the decision for war or peace was now the Kremlin’s burden and that one way or another the missiles would be removed.

Bush and the Terrorists

September 11, 2001 will forever define the Bush Presidency. That those devastating attacks are of historical significance there can be no doubt. A full assessment of the President’s response must wait for history. Perhaps in forty years we will have the benefit of declassified National Security Meeting minutes to assist in an appraisal of Bush’s actions as we do with JFK. However, the news being the first draft of history, we can attempt to make sense of what we do know. We know that Bush faced international intrigue almost from the day he was inaugurated.

In the furor over terrorism that has dominated Bush’s presidency, many forget Bush’s early confrontation with the Chi-nese. In April of 2001, four months into Bush’s administration, a U.S. spy plane was forced down over China. Similarly, the bay of Pigs was ordered four months into Kennedy’s term. The plane (not a U-2 but a U.S. reconnaissance EP-3E electronic intelligence equipped aircraft) was not fired upon, but collided with a Chinese MIG shadowing it.³ The crew were detained for 11 days but were release without inordinate saber rattling. An early diplomatic success by all accounts.

Afghanistan’s invasion also was largely perceived as a successful campaign in response to the Al Queda attacks on New York and Washington D.C. The administration suspected from the start that Al Queda was responsible for hatching the plan to use airliners as weapons. Whatever intelligence and security gaffs might have played a role in the Pentagon crash and World Trade Center destruction, Bush’s reaction was swift, powerful and effective. We confirmed the Taliban leadership was harboring Osama bin Laden and his organization. The Taliban, often viewed as irrational and erratic by western observers, refused to cooperate with U.S. demands for justice. In a matter of a few months the Taliban was gone and a new representative government was being installed in Afghanistan. Al Queda was dispersed, much of it’s leadership killed or captured, and the chieftains, Mullah Ohmar and Osama bin Laden were unable to stick their heads out of their caves.

Pride goeth before destruction, and an haughty spirit before a fall.⁴

Possibly, it was these early successes which lead to some amount of hubris by the Bush administration where JFK learned some humility due to prior mistakes. While the September 11 attacks have been compared to Pearl Harbor as a massive security failure; the fruitless search for weapons of mass destruction, which was the centerpiece of the Bush administration’s rationale for invading Iraq, can be compared to the Bay of Pigs as one of the biggest intelligence disasters in U.S. history. The similarity of the two incidents is that both relied on incomplete intelligence, which is usually the case, and faulty analysis with some wishful thinking on each president’s part. Where Kennedy had learned to be cautious because of the Bay of Pigs, to doubt the final interpretation of the intelligence community, and reign in hawks in the situation room during the Cuban Mis-sile Crisis; Bush must have been emboldened in the Iraq decision because prior to that the CIA and military had performed so brilliantly.

It would be unfair to continue the comparison of the Bay of Pigs with Iraq WMD’s. The scale of the consequences of the two incidents is enormous. Although the defeated U.S. backed forces in Cuba resulted in our humiliation and international criticism, the cost of the Iraq invasion and subsequent occupation can be measured in hundreds of billions of dollars and thousands of lives. Kennedy at least enjoyed support for his actions at home, even from the heads of the opposition party. Bush has been roundly criticized by both friends and foes throughout the world and has given his opponents incredible ammunition to use against his attempt at reelection. No doubt had the Cuban invasion been successful and Adlai Stevenson been allowed to take credit for it, “regime change” would have been the essence of the “Kennedy Doctrine.” That was precisely the oppo-site result JFK intended. He was so adamant that the affair remain clandestine that his reluctance to more fully support the Cuban invasion doomed the mission to failure.

A better comparison would be the Cuban Missile Crisis to the Iraq invasion. In these situations the two presidents were in the same timeframe in their respective terms, however their learning curves were reversed. Kennedy went from embarrassment to prudence. Bush evolved from successful diplomatic and military campaigns to extraordinary leaps of faith in his conclusions regarding Saddam Hussein’s intent and capabilities and the ease of postwar transition. In each situation the President’s chief advisors disagreed on the proper course of action with the State Department fulfilling its usual role as dove.

Secretary of State Colin Powell, well respected at home and abroad, certainly considered his “Adlai moment”⁵ as a reference to U.N. Ambassador Stevenson’s famous accusation, complete with incriminating photographs, that the Soviets had delivered mis-siles to Cuba. Powell displayed raw intelligence to the world on the floor of the Security Council to pursuade the world as well as the American people of the necessity of overthrowing Saddam Hussein’s dangerous regime by force. With the case that the urgency for action was somehow “massaged” out of ambiguous intelligence becoming more and more evident, Powell’s performance at the United Nations is more reminiscent of Ambassador Stevenson’s untenable quandary after his credibility had been shattered at the U.N. because his denials of U.S. involvement in the Cuban invasion had been proven to be lies.

Unlike Adlai Stevenson after the Bay of Pigs, Colin Powell, as a former Chairman of the Joint Chief, was very experience in interpretation of raw intelligence and presumably was armed with as much information as the rest of the administration. With CIA Director George Tenant sitting behind him, Powell gave a very convincing multimedia argument before the Security Council on February 5, 2001. The presentation, however, lacked a definitive “smoking gun,” despite Powell’s insistence that "What we are giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence."⁶ Since the invasion of Iraq, U.N. and U.S. weapons inspectors have been vocal about the disparity between perception before the war and reality on the ground in the Iraq.

Asked if he would have recommended an invasion knowing Iraq had no prohibited weapons, Powell replied: "I don't know, because it was the stockpile that presented the final little piece that made it more of a real and present danger and threat to the region and to the world." He said the "absence of a stockpile changes the political calculus; it changes the answer you get."⁷

Powell certainly sounded more like Stevenson’s most famous Security Council appearance where he directly confronted the Soviets with photographic evidence “Don’t wait for the translation...” of missiles and launchers on the ground in Cuba. Powell showed photographs of buildings with suspicious trucks parked out front, intercepts of conversations regarding cleaning up and destroying stuff before inspectors arrived, stories from defectors of nerve gas and anthrax production, and a tally of horrendous weapons the inspectors could not account for. The result, however, is just as embarrassing as the Bay of Pigs fiasco, but on a grander scale with more consequential results.

The situation with Iraq may may be understandable, and only after the November 2004 presidential election will we see if it was forgivable. The USSR came into existence the same year Kennedy was born, in all fairness JFK was dealing with an adversary who was well known and the rules of the game long established. George W. Bush faced an all new enemy unlike any faced before. The Soviet Union assumed Imperial Russia’s role as a great em-pire who played by established norms of international law. Al Queda members are international criminals. They pose a unique challenge to the law enforcement community who never faced an crime organization with destructive capabilities heretofore reserved for nation-states. Our military was designed to face forces controlled by government leaders promoting their national if not personal interests. The Al Queda leadership lives in caves, not palaces, and our understanding of their motivation is still in the development stage. Death and destruction for its own sake seems irrational.

Perhaps one of the reasons Kennedy weathered the storm of controversy following the Bay of Pigs fiasco so well is because Americans can forgive mistakes as long as the culprits are willing to take responsibility for their actions. JFK wasted no time before accepting full blame for the failed Cuban invasion, although there was plenty of blame to spread around. He was duly respected for that. Nixon’s downfall came about because he tried to weasel out of responsibility for the dirty tricks of his staff. Clinton’s legacy will always be tainted by his prevarications regarding his promiscuity. Americans can’t stand liars and hate scoundrels who run from accountability. That is why presidents who are considered “great” are without exception deemed honorable as well.

For Whom the Buck Stops.

President Harry S. Truman’s oft quoted maxim that the ultimate responsibility for the actions and consequences of administration policy lies with the President alone. Accountability is highlighted in the spotlight of a national crisis. When pol-icy advisors disagree the nation relies on the president to make the key decisions. He must be decisive, lives depend on it.

When President Washington formed his first cabinet, he deliberately chose men with diametrically opposed political views. The first Attorney General, Edmund Randolph, and Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson were southern liberals while northern conservatives Alexander Hamilton and General Henry Knox became Secretaries of Treasury and War respectively. Sadly this tradition of creating a cabinet with diversity in political view-points has long been abandoned in favor of diversity in race and gender.

In contrast, Abraham Lincoln, according to his biographers, “surrounded himself with men of such conflicting views that he could not rely on them to work together.” and gave cabinet ministers enormous discretion while keeping his own counsel.⁸ Ronald Reagan was famous for staying above the fray while delegating enormous authority to many of the same officials comprising both Bush presidencies. Like Lincoln, the public’s trust in Reagan’s personal integrity coupled with their mastery of oratory maintained their overwhelming popularity. Achieving wide-spread personal popularity is a most effective means of leading an otherwise deadlocked government.

Anyone who has watched C-Span for over ten minutes, served on any kind of committee, participated in union, club or P.T.A. meetings, can attest to the agonizingly slow and awkward process democratic decision making can be. Invariably, even among the the most educated and experienced cabinet members, disagreements occur, even if they are not purposely chosen for their differing opinions. It is inevitable that at times of the most grave crisis, the most diametrically opposed viewpoints will surface between presidential advisors. The true meddle of a President can be judged by the manner in which he takes advice and makes those decisions that are his ultimate responsibility. A President must not only be accountable for the decisions he makes, but also for the manner in which he makes them.

The degree of involvement during cabinet meetings reveal profound differences between Presidents Kennedy and G.W. Bush. Kennedy is often characterized as always engaged, easily the smartest man in the room. This is no small compliment when his cabinet was considered “the best and the brightest.” Kennedy would ask insightful and intelligent questions, testing the premises and conclusions of his advisors, seeming to intellectually leap ahead of the discussion to form decisive and informed decisions.

On the other hand, President Bush is described more derisively. Former Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neil, part of the “Dream Team” making up Bush’s National Security Council, said Bush was so disengaged during Cabinet meetings that the president reminded him of a "blind man in a room full of deaf people."⁹ This only served to reinforce many critic’s contention that the President is out of touch and ill informed. Instead of engaging in an informed discussion of the direction of the administration’s fiscal policy, Bush quietly listened as O’Neil (much to his astonishment) was reduced to merely reciting a lecture on current budgetary options. After O'Neil left the administration in disagreement over the propriety of tax-cut dur-ing a recession (a policy Herbert Hoover also adhered to during the Great Depression), a record deficit and “jobless recovery” belie the reality that Bush’s financial decisions were a product of political rationale instead of responsible fiscal policy.

Bush naturally delegates and defers to those subordinates who served his father and Reagan so well. Unfortunately he lacks the first President Bush’s experience in government service or Reagan’s charisma. Politics, unfortunately, is largely a matter of perception. Some may characterize this management style as responsible delegation of authority while others argue that it exposes a leader who is not in control. Lincoln, who was little known even his own party when he quietly arrived in Washington D.C., presided over a chaotic cabinet and unruly Congress. This in no small way emboldened the attack on Fort Sumptner by southerners to who had yet to appreciate the power of Lincoln’s personality and strength of his resolve.

G.W. Bush’s laize faire management style during cabinet meetings is indicative of his handling of security issues as well. Is is not unfair to extend this analogy when one considers that this is a leader who prides himself on not reading any newspapers and relying on staffers to brief him on appropriate subjects of importance. Most of his predecessors awoke reading three or more papers a day, showing a natural intellectual curiosity which not only kept them informed, but can stimulate investigation into issues which these president deemed interesting if not important. A self-informed president continually reinforces his ability to analyze the problems he encounters while sharpening his critical thinking skills. Americans count on a president to make the right decisions at the right time. Leaders who do not exercise these skills are at the mercy of events and those surrounding them.

President Bush allows his staff to decide what he should find important, and by passively listening to their lectures they are free to frame the discussion in such a way as to influence the outcome. Whether consciously or inadvertently, everyone has an agenda which can, unintentionally or not, insert itself into a policy briefing. Bush cabinet consists of powerful men and women with powerful beliefs born of powerful ideology. How can their personal desires not intrude into what the President is told? This is especially dangerous if he has no outside information with which to form his own opinions so as to be able to at least question and test the motives of his briefers.

This country is as acutely divided then at any time since the civil war. There is an outcry by his detractors that President Bush bungled the economy and instituted a failed foreign policy is understandable in light of his lack of education and experience. The manner in which he squandered the domestic and international solidarity manifested in reaction to the September 11, 2001 attacks are used as by his opponents to prove that he is ill equipped to handle the responsibility of the presidency. They can list their own accomplishments as equal to the previous men who have sat in the Oval office to make President Bush seem like a child among his elders.

Wanted: Chief Executive. Qualified candidates should be well-educated, experienced, with proven leadership skills.

Every previous president shares at least one of eleven specific criteria found in an analysis of their credentials. These presidential prerequisites can be examined in three broad categories: education, leadership ability, and experience in national government.

- Educational excellence

Lawyers or studied law [26]

College Presidents [3]

Honors graduates [3]

- Federal Government

Senators [14]

Congressmen [14]

Vice Presidents [13]

Cabinet Secretaries [8]

Ambassadors/International expertise [8]

Founding Fathers [4]

- Proven Leadership

Governors [15]

War Heroes [12]


Meeting the most of these qualifications was George Herbert Walker Bush with six, dwarfing the one standard his son met: Governor. Jefferson and Buchanan had five each with LBJ, Nixon, Polk, Tyler, Jackson, Monroe, Andrew Johnson and John Adams each boasting four of the eleven benchmarks. The fourteen presidents who achieved at least 3 of the standards share this distinction with the Father of the Constitution, James Madison, and can, with one exception, point to a lifetime dedicated to a combination of academic excellence and public service. Only William Henry Harrison does not count scholarly pursuits among his three major accomplishments, however his distinguished military career was interrupted only by a term as Senator and two as Governor. His proven military leadership combined with executive experience and federal legislative qualifications was more than an ample substitute for formal education.

Meeting only two qualifications is no embarrassment when the length of time spent in public service is counted in decades. George Washington met only two standards -- legislative service and military success. However, his status as an abundantly qualified president was never in question due to his lifelong dedication to this nation.

George Washington was not only a military genius, but stands alongside Presidents John Adams, Jefferson, and Madison as architects of the constitution, heroes of the revolution and intellectual giants who founded the most enduring representative republic on the planet. “We The People” formed a nation of laws, not men. In fact, of the forty-two men who have occupied the White House, most (24) were lawyers.¹⁰ Two other distinguished Presidents studied law and could have practiced had they not been drawn to public service.¹¹ Notwithstanding George Bush’s vilification of trial lawyers, who despite institutional attacks and marginalization still form the front line against fascism in that they stand up to the powerful on behalf of the weak. Our system requires experts in the nuances of the legal process to ensure that laymen and women can fully procure the liberties they have been promised. Law Schools only admit those who demonstrate high intelligence and proven educational acumen. When leading a government dedicated to the “rule of law,” a legal background is not undesirable.

President James Madison, the “Father of the Constitution,” served in the Continental Congress and helped frame the Bill of Rights. A Princeton student of history and government well versed in law, he served as Jefferson’s Secretary of State. Jefferson himself, credited as principle author of the Declaration of Independence, was likewise a legal scholar and served as Minister to France and Washington’s Secretary of State and Adams’ vice President. Adams, a Harvard educated lawyer but known more as a philosopher than politician, was minister to both France and England before serving as the first Vice-President. His boss, George Washington, was a delegate to the Continental Congress before being appointed to lead the continental army and considered a “scholar and gentleman” whose status as a war hero and proven leader enabled him to influence the convening of the Constitutional Convention when it became obvious that the Articles of Confederation were unwieldy, and subsequently push for it’s ratification.

These first four presidents were instrumental in the formation of the constitution and thus the United States itself. Their influence on this fledgling nation cannot be underestimated. As founding fathers, they established an independent nation without the political upheavals and purges which mark so many revolutionary movements. This assured the success of our form of government and colored the temperament of our society. Each was exceptionally gifted by education and experience to be uniquely qualified for the Presidency and this country was indeed fortunate to be able to call on them as needed.

The founding four presidents all share qualities with most of their successors in office; either stemming from their education, experience or service to the country. Alongside Washington, ten other presidents can claim the moniker “war hero” on their resume. Most of the war heroes had also distinguished themselves as prominent public servants either as a U.S. Senator, state governor or were 5-star generals like Washington¹² and Eisenhower, both of whom were considered scholars and diplomats as well as consummate supreme commanders in times of unprecedented crisis. Only two presidents cannot list either elective office or scholarly credentials (such as college president or lawyer) among their other accomplishments -- war heroes Zachary Tailor and U.S. Grant. Their experience, or lack thereof, led to mixed results in the effectiveness of their administrations.

Six presidents were either ambassadors to England, France, or Russia and in the case of the first President Bush, head of the legation to China and ambassador to the UN. President Hoover had ambassadorial-like experience in heading the American Relief Administration which fed Europe after World War One. War Hero Eisenhower gained diplomatic experience when he left the presidency of Columbia University to become the first Supreme Commander of NATO. Five Secretaries of State became president which allows Madison and Van Buren to be included with the diplomats. With the inclusion of Hoover and Eisenhower, the number of presidents with impeccable foreign policy credentials rises to ten.

Thirteen presidents served as Vice-president prior to entering the Oval office, six of whom also were previous members of the Senate over which they presided. Indeed, fourteen presidents were former senators. Of the six V.P.’s turned president who were not senators during their careers Thomas Jefferson counted Ambassador to France and Secretary of State among his founding-father credentials, John Adams and Chester Arthur were lawyers and lifelong public officials, Taft was an attorney and Secretary of War, Coolidge practiced law before he became Gover-nor, Ford served as congressional leader for 25 years, and the first President Bush was a congressman, CIA Director, and ambassador before bring elected Vice-president.

Fourteen Presidents served as a member of the House of Representatives, and fifteen served as Governor. Congressman James Garfield was also President of Hiram College and congressman turned diplomat and cabinet member G.H.W. Bush graduated Phi Beta Kappa from Yale. Every other congressman who graduated to the White House was either an attorney, served on the Senate or both. A few of the lawyer/congressmen (Tyler, Polk, Hayes and McKinley) were elected to their state’s executive mansion as well.

The office of Governor gives a future president unique experience as a chief executive, however that office lacks federal leadership qualities and national security expertise. Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt, a lawyer, gained invaluable security expertise as Secretary of the Navy. Teddy Roosevelt, like William Harrison, was a distinguished war hero with keen awareness of defense issues prior to their gubernatorial election. Andrew Johnson served as Governor between stints in Congress and the Senate before becoming Lincoln’s Vice President. Naturally most of the Governor-turned-Presidents studied law, including Grover Cleveland, who other than the current President Bush, held no other national elective office nor had a distinguished military career. Of course prior to his election as the 24th President, Cleveland could list “former U.S. President” on his resumé when he became the 26th president. Only recently have non-lawyer/ non-war-hero Governors moved from executive mansions in their State capitols directly to the White House without ever holding any other federal office, namely: James Carter, Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush.

President Carter, many forget, was not just a peanut farmer turned politician but a graduate of Annapolis who rose in rank to submarine commander, as an expert in nuclear physics he possessed intimate knowledge of the awesome forces at the disposal of a commander-in-chief. Ronald Reagan spent eight years living in Sacramento, and not only can point to the fact that he served longer as Governor than G.W. Bush, but had gained invaluable national political insight as head of the screen-actor’s guild, defending the movie industry from countless political attacks. Ironically, Reagan, once a champion the liberals as he defended Hollywood from communist accusations and investigations, became an icon of the conservative movement as the President credited with the downfall of the Soviet Union. His switch from the Democratic party to the Republican shows a profound self examination as well as a studied analysis of the national and domestic course he believed in the best interest of this country.

George W. Bush served as Texas Governor for six years after barely graduating with a masters in business administration and running an oil company and a baseball team. He did serve longer as Governor than Polk (lawyer, congressman, honors graduate from U.N.C.), Cleveland (lawyer), T. Roosevelt (war hero), Wilson (law professor, university president), Coolidge (lawyer, Vice-President), and Franklin Roosevelt (lawyer, Secretary of the Navy). Jimmy Carter, like G.W. Bush, was only Governor for six years, like Bush moving directly to Washington in the midst of his second term. However, one cannot compare Bush’s military career as an occasional member of the air national guard, nor his mediocre academic performances to Jimmy Carter’s.

George W. Bush was the most unqualified man ever to become president. Our system relies on the intelligent and informed decisions of a chief executive who is not only well advised, but can also call on his own experience and intellectual abilities when his advisors disagree or inadvertently mislead him. When he makes a mistake he must rectify the situation and honestly admit the failure. He must carefully check his facts before making scandalous pronouncements, and when his “facts” turn out to be misleading or flat-out wrong, he must take responsibility without resorting to the blame game that our intelligence was faulty or his words were misinterpreted. To do otherwise is dishonorable. It was not the fault of bad intelligence but the political interpretation and use of intelligence.

George W. Bush has behaved dishonorably, and the conse-quences of his outrageous behavior will be felt by America, Iraq, and the entire international community for decades. He lied in his State of the Union message in January of 2003 about Iraq’s purchase of uranium, and blamed it on ambiguous intelligence. His administration minced words, purposely presenting worst case scenarios for Iraq’s weapons capabilities in his march to war. This administration left no doubt that the situation was urgent and needed to be addressed, with force if necessary, sooner rather than later. They did nothing to dispel the sense of urgency, indeed they fostered it. Colin Powell states that he never used the word “imminent,” but he described “those deadly weapons programs” Iraq supposedly possessed as a “real and present dangers to the region and to the world.” He certainly sounds like like he’s trying to determine what the definition of the word “is” is.¹³ “Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists, including members of Al Qaeda,” said the president in the 2003 State of the Union address, calling Iraq a “gathering threat,” part of the “Axis of Evil.”¹⁴ He effectively made the case that we cannot wait until the threat was imminent with no real proof, just fear based on supposition. To boldly state that regardless of whether the threat was real or imagined, the world is a safer place is dishonorable. To an honorable man the ends do not justify the means. An honorable man would admit that he was overzealous, would handle things differently in hindsight, and that although the cause was just and his perception of the danger real no matter how ill founded, his behavior to our allies and the American people was regrettable. In other words, if Bush wants to put this behind him he must take full responsibil-ty and apologize.

Lives were lost due to the Iran-Contra affair, but because Ronald Reagan was considered an honorable man the scandal left his administration largely unscathed. Clinton was impeached, Nixon would have been impeached and removed if he had not resigned, and Warren G. Harding’s memory will be forever disgraced by the corruption running rampant in his White House. Nobody died because of because of Teapot Dome scandal, Watergate, or Monica Lewinsky; however, because these president’s indiscretions touched the very heart of their personal character, they will for all time be dishonored. It is not too late for George W. Bush, but time may be running out. If he were to stand tall and state simply that he pushed too fast and too far in making the case against Saddam Hussein and admit that it was a mistake not to let the international community come to a consensus before letting “slip the dogs of war,” he will go far in restoring the prestige of the United States and his own personal honor. When faced with a massive intelligence failure, coupled with a huge military miscalculation, JFK did the honorable thing and accepted all blame. George W. Bush should too.

---------------------------

¹ Notes on Cabinet Meeting, Chester Bowles, April 20, 1961, Source: U.S., Department of State, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1961-1963, Volume X, Cuba, 1961-1962

² Source material for this analysis from Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, vol. XI: Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Department of State, 1996) “Transcriptions of Records of NSC and EXCOMM Meetings, October, 1962”

³ see e.g. , “Top U.S. General Making Visit to China,” ROBERT BURNS, Associated Press,
Posted on Sat, Jan. 10, 2004

⁴ Proverbs xvi. 18.

⁵ “Powell's Case, a Year Later: Gaps in Picture of Iraq Arms,” The New York Times, February 1, 2004.

⁶ Full text of Colin Powell's speech:(US secretary of state's address to the United Nations security
council), February 5, 2003 Guardian Unlimited © Guardian Newspapers Limited 2003

⁷ “Powell Says New Data May Have Affected War Decision”, Tue Feb 3, 2004, Washington Post

⁸ Benjamin P. Thomas, Author of "Abraham Lincoln: A Biography" and David Herbert Donald, Harry C. Black, Director of the Institute of Southern History, Johns Hopskins University:cited in Grolier’s The American Presidency (http://gi.grolier.com/presidents/ea/bios/16plinc.html)

⁹ Ron Suskind: (The Price of Loyalty)

¹⁰ Although G.W. Bush is the 43rd President, Grover Cleveland, both the 22nd and 24th President was a Lawyer before becoming Mayor of Buffalo and Governor of New York.

¹¹ Madison “read law” and could have practiced but never entered the profession. Buchanan much like Lincoln also was well versed in law and spent 20 years in the congress and senate, was an ambassador to Russia and Great Britain and served as Secretary of State before becoming President.

¹² In 1976 Washington was posthumously promoted to 6-star by act of Congress.

¹³ Full text of Colin Powell's speech:(US secretary of state's address to the United Nations Security Council), February 5, 2003 Guardian Unlimited © Guardian Newspapers Limited 2003

¹⁴ State of the Union address, Tuesday, January 28, 2003 eMediaMillWorks